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1 INTRODUCTION  
Critical infrastructures (CIs) like the electricity, 
oil & gas supply, rail, road, air, sea transport, inter-
net networks, are highly interconnected and mutual-
ly dependent in complex ways, both physically and 
through a multitude of information and communica-
tion technologies (so called cyber-based systems) 
used for data acquisition and control. The coupling 
of CIs leads to the concept of "systems-of-systems", 
which implies that single CIs cannot be studied in 
isolation from other CIs; rather, it is necessary to as-
sess the limitations that interacting CIs pose on the 
operating conditions of the individual infrastructures 
so as to implement adequate protections for prevent-
ing failures in one CI from cascading to other de-
pendent CIs. 
The 2001 prolonged power crisis in California 
demonstrates the importance of coupling in interde-
pendent CIs (Rinaldi et al., 2001). The crisis took 
place when electric power disruptions at various 
times curtailed natural gas production (first order ef-
fects); the latter generated a shutdown of steam in-
jection in heavy oil production (second order ef-
fects). 
A common denominator is needed to assess the 
vulnerability of a system that is exposed to natural 
and accidental hazards, and threats of malevolent 
acts. The need is to capture the CI vulnerability 
sources and issues, given its technical and physical 
features, and the dependencies and interdependen-
cies on other systems. This requires an evaluation of 
the exposure to different hazards, including threats 
of malevolent acts. 
An analysis aimed at identifying the causes of 
damage or disruption of services in CIs needs to em-
brace an all-hazard approach (Waugh, 2004), 
(Pollet and Cummins, 2009), encompassing a gen-
eral view on the hazards targeting a given system. 
We propose a framework for an All-HAZard 
ANalysis (A-HAZAN) which relies on tailored tabu-
lar procedures to organize the qualitative and quanti-
tative features of the system relevant for revealing 
and highlighting its vulnerabilities. The A-HAZAN 
framework is intended as a tool for managers, ana-
lysts and stakeholders of CIs to carry out the identi-
fication of all the sources of vulnerability in an all-
hazard perspective. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
some methodologies to assess the vulnerabilities of 
CIs are reviewed. In Section 3, the concepts of vul-
nerability and susceptibility are outlined from the 
perspective of CIs. In Section 4, the A-HAZAN tab-
ular procedure and a methodology are presented. In 
Section 5, the A-HAZAN methodology is applied to 
a literature case study. Conclusions are drawn in 
Section 6. 
 
2. METHODOLOGIES OF VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT  
 
Screening methodologies for prioritizing scenari-
os of terrorist threats and identifying vulnerabilities 
in single and interdependent CIs have been pro-
posed. Apostolakis and Lemon (Apostolakis and 
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Lemon, 2005) and Patterson and Apostolakis (Pat-
terson and Apostolakis, 2007) focus on the identifi-
cation of critical locations in infrastructures; these 
are seen as geographical points that are exposed to 
intentional attacks. Critical locations are not limited 
to individual infrastructures but may affect multiple 
infrastructures: for example, water and electrical dis-
tribution systems may occupy the same service tun-
nels. In the proposed scheme, the conditional proba-
bilities that the terrorists will successfully exploit a 
vulnerability need to be evaluated. The procedure 
for this relies on extensive use of expert judgment 
and may be challenging in practice. The impacts of 
attacks are treated without including the probabili-
ties of various levels of damage, and without consid-
eration of any intervention by first responders: for 
this reason, it can be defined conservative. The vul-
nerabilities and their ranking according to potential 
impact are eventually obtained by Multi-Attribute 
Utility Theory (MAUT) (Morgan et al. 2000). 
Konce et al. (Konce et al., 2008) have proposed a 
methodology for ranking components of a bulk 
power system with respect to its risk significance to 
the involved stakeholders; the likelihood and the ex-
tent of power outages when components fail to per-
form their designed functions are analyzed; the con-
sequences associated with the failures are 
determined by considering the type and number of 
customers affected. 
Johansson and Hassel (Johansson and H. Hassel, 
2010) have proposed a framework for considering 
structural and functional properties of interdepend-
ent systems and developing a predictive model in a 
vulnerability analysis context. Piwowar et al. 
(Piwowar et al., 2009) have proposed a systemic 
analysis which accounts for malevolence, i.e., the 
willingness to cause damage. 
The aim of the present work is to develop a sys-
tematic framework of system analysis for identifying 
the vulnerable elements of CIs, considering natural 
hazards, random failures and intentional attacks. 
While the first two types of vulnerability are charac-
terized by stochastic uncertainties and can be ana-
lyzed by traditional safety analysis tools, intentional 
attacks require a new way of analysis. 
 
3. HAZARDS, THREATS AND VULNERA-
BILITY  
 
In the United Nations’ view, hazard is defined as 
"a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon 
and/or human activity, which may cause loss of life 
or injury, property damage, social and economic dis-
ruption or environmental degradation. Hazards can 
be single, sequential or combined in their origin and 
effects" (Turner et al., 2003). The European Cooper-
ation for Space Standardization (ECSS) defines haz-
ard as “an existing or potential condition of an item 
that can result in an accident” (White, 1974); the 
condition is associated with the design, fabrication, 
operation or environment of the item, and has the 
potential for accidents. These two definitions en-
compass the idea of hazard described as a “condition 
prerequisite to a mishap” (UNISDR, 2004) and as “a 
source of potential harm” (ECSS, 2004). The con-
cept of hazard is strictly tied to the presence of a po-
tential source of difficulty both natural or manmade. 
On the other hand, the concept of threat is defined 
as “a potential intent to cause harm or damage to the 
system by adversely changing its state” (ISO guide, 
2009). This definition is strictly linked to intentional 
and malevolent acts (Apostolakis and Lemon, 2005), 
and it seems in contrast with the one by the US 
Homeland Security, which describes threat as a 
“natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, 
or action that has or indicates the potential to harm 
life, information, operations, the environment, 
and/or property” (OHS, 2009). In the latter, little ref-
erence is made to the idea of intention embedded in 
the former definition of threat. From these defini-
tions, the broader concept of hazard emerges as a 
general condition of potential source of harm. There-
fore, it encompasses the intentionality of threats, 
e.g., terrorist acts that are distinguished by a malevo-
lent intelligence directed toward maximum social 
disruption. 
In the all-hazard approach, malevolent acts, acci-
dental and natural occurrences are all considered. 
Yet, they require a different analytical treatment. 
Random accidents, natural failures and unintentional 
man-made hazards are typically known and catego-
rized by emergency planners. Their occurrence can 
be typically addressed within a probabilistic frame-
work (Figure 1). Conversely, terrorism is a hazard 
that eludes a quantification by probability theory due 
to the intentional and malevolent planning it implies 
(Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. All–Hazard Approach overview. 
 
The concept of vulnerability follows the degree of 
impact that an hazard has on the CI. In (Konce et al., 
2008), vulnerability is defined as “the degree to 
which a system, a subsystem or a system component 
is likely to experience harm due to exposure to a 
hazard, either a perturbation or stress” or, equiva-
lently, in (Apostolakis and Lemon, 2005) as the 
“manifestation of inherent states of the system (e.g., 
physical, technical, organizational, cultural) that can 
be exploited by an adversary to harm or damage the 
system”. Along the same line of thought, vulnerabil-
ity is also defined as a physical feature or operation-
al attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation 
or susceptible to a given hazard (OHS, 2009). The 
United Nations define vulnerability as the conditions 
determined by physical, social, economic, and envi-
ronmental factors or processes, which increase the 
susceptibility of a community to the impact of haz-
ards (UNISDR, 2004). 
Quantitatively, vulnerability focuses on three as-
pects (Konce et al., 2008): 
- degree of losses and damages due to the impact 
of a hazard; 
- degree of exposure to the hazards, i.e., likeli-
hood of being exposed to hazards of a certain degree 
and susceptibility of an element at the risk of suffer-
ing losses and damages; 
- degree of resilience, i.e., ability of a system to an-
ticipate, cope with/absorb, resist and recover from 
the impact of a hazard or disaster. 
Practically, vulnerability comes from flaws or 
weaknesses in the design, implementation, operation 
and management of an infrastructure that makes it 
susceptible to destruction or incapacitation when ex-
posed to a hazard or threat, or reduces its capacity to 
resume stable conditions. For example, the vulnera-
bility of the electric power system might be quanti-
fied in terms of changes in network characteristics 
following attacks on nodes, and the scale (e.g., num-
ber of nodes/lines lost) or duration of the associated 
losses. In a somewhat more intuitive interpretation, 
vulnerability characterizes a system component or 
an aspect of a system (Jönsson et al., 2008). A com-
ponent is said to be a vulnerability of a system if its 
failure causes large negative consequences. In this 
sense, the component is said to be critical and the 
term vulnerability describes a property which can be 
employed for ranking the system’s components with 
respect to their criticality. 
Given the above, the goals of vulnerability analy-
sis becomes then (Kroger and Zio, 2011): 
 
1. identifying the set and sequences of events 
that cause damages and losses; 
2. identifying  the relevant set of "initiating 
events" and evaluate their cascading impact 
on a subset of elements, or the system as a 
whole; 
3. determining and elaborating on (inter)-
dependencies (within the system and among 
systems) and on coupling of different orders, 
given the set of initiating events and ob-
served outcomes. 
The ultimate goal is to identify obvious and, most 
important, hidden vulnerabilities in infrastructure 
systems to act for managing and reducing them. The 
achievement of these goals relies on the analysis of 
the system, of its parts and of their interactions. The 
analysis must account for the environment where the 
system operates, and for the objectives the system is 
designed to achieve. During the development of 
such basic system understanding, first vulnerabilities 
may already emerge. 
In this paper, an All-HAZard ANalysis (A-
HAZAN) framework is proposed to grasp the com-
plementary aspects of random failures, or uninten-
tional or natural occurrences, and malevolent attacks 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. All-hazard vulnerability analysis including the as-
sessment of random, natural and unintentional occurrences, as 
well as threats of intentional, malevolent acts. 
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4. THE A–HAZAN ANALYSIS 
 
We propose a tabular methodology for the all-
hazard vulnerability analysis of CIs. It aims at iden-
tifying the features, operating conditions and failure 
modes relevant to CI vulnerability. A tabular proce-
dure is developed to collect and organize the rele-
vant information to the vulnerability characterization 
of the system’s components (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1. The A-HAZAN Table. 
Task (Funtion) Component Features Geographic Location Hazards 
      
USER Load Bus Size Area 
THREATS 
 
  
    
Level of demand Bus Name RANDOM FAILURES 
    
Environmental 
conditions 
  
INTRA-System 
Degree 
Centralities 
Communities 
    
Maintenance 
  
INTER-System 
Physical 
    
Level of protec-
tion   
Logical 
    Social criticality   Cyber 
        Geographic 
        EXTERNAL 
CAUSES  
Natural hazards 
Human activity 
  
Diffuse 
        
Local 
  
        
Starting from their functional role, the compo-
nents of the system are broadly divided into three 
main categories: namely, user, transmitter and pro-
vider. A user is the target or the recipient of a par-
ticular task or service, e.g., a load bus in the power 
transmission network (or the consumer in a water 
supply system). A transmitter functions as a spread-
er of the task or service, e.g., the transmission lines 
in the power grid (or the pipelines in the water sup-
ply system). A provider is the component which 
originates that particular task or service, e.g., the 
generating units in the power transmission network 
(or the waterworks in the water supply system). 
For each of the components, the relevant features 
that impact on its role as source of vulnerability are 
listed. The size is the physical dimension (if the 
component is large, it may need large protections). 
The level of supply, of transmission or of demand 
are the quantities of power supplied, transmitted or 
consumed by the component, and the fraction of the 
service produced, transmitted or consumed by the 
component with respect to the overall power pro-
duced, transmitted or demanded by the whole sys-
tem. The level of protection refers to the logical and 
physical barriers deployed to prevent or discourage 
malevolent acts. The social criticality anticipates the 
impact on public opinion of the effects of the inten-
tional attack, given that it is successfully accom-
plished. The most relevant consequences here con-
sidered are measured in terms of human losses and 
geographic extension. Other features are i.e., perma-
nent outages and transient outages, the effect of en-
vironmental conditions and temperature, or mainte-
nance operations. 
Other critical aspects of a system’s component 
are its logical position and geographic location (Pat-
terson and Apostolakis, 2007). It is important to 
know the position of the component with respect to 
the system and to the environment, and the connec-
tions and interconnections between the component 
and other systems. 
Other specific features related to the physics of 
the provided service are accounted for in this quali-
tative analysis step. Examples are given in Section 5 
with reference to a power transmission grid. 
Then, vulnerability characterization in the all-
hazard approach considers the following (Table 1): 
 Threats. These are potential events character-
ized by the act of a malevolent intelligence 
directed towards maximum social disruption 
(Section 3). 
 Random failures. These are typically perma-
nent or transient outages due to components’ 
failures and may be identified by standard 
risk analysis techniques (e.g., FMECA, 
Hazop, and others). 
 INTRA-system failures. These are failures 
within the system, typically dependent fail-
ures.  
 External causes. This term considers natural 
hazards, such as meteorological or seismic 
phenomena, and unintentional human-
induced hazards, such as the processing or 
the storage of potentially hazardous materi-
als, or nearby military installations. External 
causes may be further grouped into local ex-
ternal causes, e.g., a lightening striking a 
building or an aircraft crash, or diffuse exter-
nal causes, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, 
flooding or the leakage of explosive or toxic 
materials. 
 
5. A-HAZAN OF THE IEEE RTS-96  
 
The IEEE 1996 reliability test system (RTS-96) 
(IEEE RTS-96, 1999) is considered (Figure 3). It 
contains 24 buses and 38 transmission lines. The 
buses consist of nine load-only buses, eight 
load/generation buses, three generation-only buses 
and four transmission buses (no load or generation 
on the bus). The test system does not refer to any 
particular geographic location; however, in the fol-
lowing, we suppose and characterize the locations of 
its components in order to contextualize the all-
hazard framework. 
 
 
Figure 3. Single area IEEE RTS-96 grid (IEEE RTS-96, 1999). 
 
Five different types of generating units are con-
sidered: oil/steam, coal/steam, oil/combustion tur-
bine (CT), hydro and nuclear generating units. In 
Table 2, the A-HAZAN Table of a generating unit, 
i.e., the nuclear power plant sited at bus (ID)18, is 
exemplified. It is supposed to be located in a plain, 
near a river or a lake, possibly in a non-seismic area, 
far from urbanized areas and highways. In general, it 
can be supposed that the power plant does not lie 
under commercial air routes. This is a typical loca-
tion for European nuclear power plants. 
In the second column, the features of the power 
plant are summarized. Along with the generated 
power (size), i.e., 400 MW of active power and 137 
MVAR of reactive power, and the percentage of the 
overall generated power, i.e., 12% of the entire pow-
er generated by the grid (level of supply), the type of 
generating unit, i.e., nuclear plant, and the total 
number of units of that type in the system, i.e., 1, are 
listed. A nuclear power plant has a high social criti-
cality: the impact of an accident in the plant is high, 
both on public opinion and on public health. Due to 
its intrinsic dangerousness, a nuclear power plant is 
provided with maximum security measures and is 
classified as completely secure. The identification of 
environmental conditions is more suitable for a 
component than for an entire plant. For an entire 
plant, environmental conditions are replaced by the 
age of the infrastructure, or the characterizing ambi-
ance: brackish air or degree of humidity. Mainte-
nance accounts for all the joint operations regarding 
fuel supply and waste disposal, as well as compo-
nents maintenance, e.g., turbines, thermal exchang-
ers, or steam generators, as well as maintenance of 
the buildings and of the non-operational part of the 
plant, e.g., offices, air filtering systems. 
In the third column, the specific area is detailed. 
In a general view, it could be assumed as a flat area. 
Following the definitions given in Section 4, in 
the fifth column, threats are grouped under the label 
“sabotage” and “terroristic attacks”, where sabotage 
is meant as a deliberate action intended to ‘‘damage, 
disrupt, or subvert the organization’s operations for 
the personal purposes of the saboteur by creating un-
favorable publicity, embarrassment, delays in pro-
duction, damage to property, the destruction of 
working relationships, or the harming of employees 
or customers’’ (Crino, 1994). For example, in a 
workplace setting, sabotage is the conscious with-
drawal of efficiency generally directed at causing 
some change in workplace conditions. On the other 
hand, terroristic attacks are actions intended to cause 
a strong psychological effect by means of disruption 
and death. 
Random failures are identified via 
FMEA/FMECA analysis on the power plant. Con-
sidering the function of the plant as a provider ele-
ment, random failure rates are given in (IEEE RTS-
96, 1999). 
Intra-system features account for the connection 
of the component to other elements of the system, 
for example, lines T-29, T-31-1, T-31-2 outages 
which would prevent the power to flow from the 
provider to the users along the involved path. 
Inter-system features encompass all interdepend-
encies between the system and other infrastructures. 
We consider the possible interdependencies between 
the power plant and other infrastructure systems: 
water and fuel supply, transport network or the in-
terdependencies between the communication system 
and the provider. 
 
Table 2. Qualitative part of the A-HAZAN Table for a nuclear generating unit in the RTS-96 (IEEE RTS-96, 1999). 
  
Task 
(Funtion) 
Compnent   Features 
    
Geographic 
Location 
Hazards 
 
     ID   MW MVAR   
USER Load Bus 101 Size:  108 22 
Area: 1 
(zone11) 
INTENTIONAL ATTACKS 
Sabotage 
Terroristic attacks 
      
Level of de-
mand: 3,8%     
Bus Name: 
Abel 
RANDOM FAILURES from 
PRA/FMEA/FMECA   
      
Level of pro-
tection: 
locked, non-
complex bar-
riers, fences       
INTRA-System: 
lines outage : T-
1, T-2, T-3 
Degree  
Communities 
Centralities 
 
      
Social critical-
ity: moderate 
      
INTER-System 
Physical: transport network 
(rail, road and air) 
 
Environmental 
conditions: 
aging and deg-
radation of the 
plant, humidi-
ty, brackish 
ambience, 
temperature 
      Maintenance         Logical: economics, political 
              
  
Cyber: Scada System/ Power 
for switches 
                Geographic:  co-location 
              
EXTERNAL 
CAUSES 
Diffuse: earthquakes, flooding, 
tornadoes, storms  
Local: stroke of lightning, land-
slides, snow, military maneu-
vers, aircraft crashes  
  
 
              
Natural Hazards 
Human Activity 
  
              
 
 
Natural hazards and human activities can be 
found under the definition of external causes. This is 
strictly tied with the location of the component and 
of the system in general. Natural hazards can be 
roughly divided as follows: seismic phenomena (i.e., 
earthquakes, landslides, etc.), volcano eruptions, me-
teorological phenomena (frequent meteorological 
events, i.e., wind, precipitations, snow pack, temper-
ature, etc. and rare meteorological phenomena such 
as: tornadoes, storms, etc.) and flooding (i.e., haz-
ards resulting from flooding of river, sea, lakes and 
semi-enclosed water bodies, groundwater, etc.). In 
Table 6, considering a frat terrain as the site, specific 
natural hazards are: flooding, storm and earthquakes. 
The identification of potential sources of hazard 
due to unintentional human activities in the proxi-
mate areas are considered: processing or storing of 
potentially hazardous materials (such as explosive,  
 
 
flammable, corrosive, toxic or radioactive materi-
als), aircraft crashes, railway rolling stocks and  
road traffic, military installations and future hu-
man activities in the planning stage, e.g., lands with 
potential for commercial development. 
The external causes can be specified further in lo-
cal and diffuse hazards, depending on the affected 
portion of the system. An example of local natural 
hazard is a stroke lightening on a transmission line. 
Diffuse hazards are mudslides due to heavy rains or 
flooding of rivers or lakes, for power plants and 
transmission towers. 
In order to proceed in the analysis, a small por-
tion of the RTS-96 (IEEE RTS-96, 1999) has been 
selected (Figure 4). It consists of a user (load bus 
(ID)101), a provider (generating unit located at bus 
(ID)1), a transmission line (line T-2) and a transmis-
sion line with a transformer (line T-7).  
  
 
Figure 4. Portion of the RTS-96 (IEEE RTS-96, 1999) power 
grid described in Section 5 including bus (ID)101, generating 
unit (ID)1 and transmission lines T-2 and T-7. 
  
The A-HAZAN Tables describing the characteris-
tics of these components are here not reported, due 
to limitation of space. However, the salient aspects 
are described in the following. 
In the A-HAZAN Table for the load bus, several 
features are highlighted, i.e., the absolute quantity of 
power requested (size), i.e., 108 MW of active pow-
er and 22 MVAR of reactive power needed by the 
bus (ID)101, and the percentage of power flow re-
quired by the particular bus with respect to the entire 
transmission network power requirements (level of 
demand), i.e., 3.8% of the total 2850 MW requested 
by the network, (IEEE RTS-96, 1999). Depending 
on the type of load bus, the level of protection is 
taken into account: a transmission grid load bus is 
typically located far from densely-populated areas 
and it is usually locked, surrounded by fences but no 
other complex barriers. The impact of the compo-
nent role is assumed moderate, since it is expected 
that if a load bus cannot receive power, the genera-
tion of power is easily modulated, the power excess 
is eliminated, and the overall infrastructure still pro-
vides its service. The presence of special costumers 
on the load bus should be verified, e.g., hospitals, 
airports, energy-intensive factories. Special attention 
is devoted to the Environmental conditions, other 
than natural hazards, characterizing the component 
in a network. For example, the aging or the degrada-
tion of the components, due to specific conditions of 
the location site, i.e., the humidity of the air or the 
brackish ambience may cause corrosion or damage 
to the buildings. The temperature range is also an 
important issue to account for. An exceptionally hot 
summer or an extremely cold winter impose addi-
tional strain on the component. 
In the Table, a description of the hazards is also 
given. Some of the items have been discussed in 
Section 4, and in reference to Table 2. For this par-
ticular component, the intra-system hazards are re-
ferred to failures that may occur when the connec-
tions (T-1, T-2 and T-3) between the component and 
the network are damaged. 
A specific A-HAZAN contains the description of 
the generating unit sited at bus (ID)1. Additional 
features are, along with the generated power (size) 
and the percentage of generated power in the grid 
(level of supply), the type of generating unit and the 
number of units of the particular type of provider. 
The level of protection is also considered: the plant 
is isolated from the urbanized areas and it is usually 
guarded with security patrols, video surveillance of 
the entire power plant and alarms. A provider is as-
sumed to have a high level of criticality, because in 
general its entire power supply cannot be readily re-
placed by alternative generation. Environmental 
conditions should also be taken into account; age 
and degradation affect the power plant (or its con-
stituents) full functionality. 
For this particular component, the intra-system 
hazards are referred to failures that may occur when 
the connections (T-1, T-2 and T-3) between the plant 
and the network are damaged.  
Two tables are used to report the features pertain-
ing to components referred to as transmitters be-
cause they are not the recipients of the electrical ser-
vice but perform the propagation of the service. 
Transmitters include transmission lines and trans-
formers. The highlighted physical parameters are: 
the direction of the lines, from bus 101 to bus 103, 
their capacities, their lengths, 55 miles, and the elec-
trical characteristics of the transmitter, i.e., re-
sistance (R = 0.055 Ω), reactance (X = 0.211 Ω) and 
susceptance (B = 0.057 S). Transmission towers are 
usually located in isolated sites, e.g., open country 
and they are not provided with any particular fence 
or barriers. Nor are they watched by patrol. Trans-
mission lines environmental issues are salt pollution 
depositing on insulators on overhead lines and on 
substations, or floods and fires adjacent to electrical 
equipment, e.g., beneath overhead lines. The pruning 
of trees sited along transmission lines is also crucial: 
for example, the Italian 2003 blackout was triggered 
and accrued by two consecutive flashovers towards a 
tree of two overhead lines (Sforna and Delfanti, 
2006). 
Particular features of the transformer that con-
nects bus 103 to bus 124: a zero miles length line, a 
very small resistance, R=0.002 Ω, a reactance X= 
0.084 Ω and no susceptance, B = 0.000 S. 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A practical all-hazard analysis framework has 
been presented for merging two different perspec-
tives on vulnerability of critical infrastructures. On 
one hand, it captures the vulnerabilities due to ran-
dom failures and natural hazard; on the other hand, it 
includes vulnerabilities due to malevolent acts. In 
this sense, it extends common approaches of system 
hazard identification. 
A general organization of the relevant infor-
mation on the system components is offered on the 
basis of their tasks and of the features that character-
ize them as potential sources of vulnerability. 
For the characterization, inter- and intra-
dependencies are considered. The A-HAZAN 
framework is intended as a tool for managers, ana-
lysts and stakeholders of CIs to carry out the identi-
fication of the sources of vulnerability in an all-
hazard perspective. It can serve as an entry point in-
to the quantitative evaluation of the degree of expo-
sure of CIs to hazards of different nature. 
The future step of the analysis will be the devel-
opment of a decision logic framework for evaluating 
the susceptibility to the hazards that loom over a CI, 
i.e., random failures, unintentional acts and natural 
hazards, but also malevolent acts. 
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